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Calculating Exemptions in Bankruptcy
All Points Capital Corp. v Meyer
(In re Meyer) (BAP 9th Cir 2007) 373 BR 84
In determining extent of exemptions, liens against entire fee must be subtracted
before computing value of debtor’s interest in co-owned property.
Meyer co-owned a residence valued at $515,000 that was encumbered by a consensual
debt of $232,005. He scheduled his 50-percent joint tenancy interest as worth $257,500.
If he had liquidated the property on the day of bankruptcy, his share of the proceeds
would have been $141,497.50, or $91,497.50 net of his $50,000 homestead exemption.
Meyer’s interest was subject to two judgment liens. In first position was a lien of
$275,000 owed to American Capital Resources, Inc. All Points Capital Corporation also
had a judgment lien of $900,000.
Meyer filed a motion under 11 USC §522(f)(1) to avoid both judicial liens. Section
522(f)(2) provides a statutory formula for determining exceptions to exemptions that does
not take fractional interests in property into account. American Capital Resources did not
appear at the hearing.
All Points Capital argued that the American Capital lien should be avoided by default,
and then the consensual lien should be subtracted from the property’s value before
computing the value of the debtor’s interest in the co-owned property. Under that theory,
the equity of $282,995 for all owners would leave Meyer with $141,497.50 in value,
which after deducting the $50,000 homestead exemption would yield $91,497.50 that
could survive the §522(f)(1) lien avoidance.
The bankruptcy court did not enter a default against All Points Capital, but did grant
the avoidance motion in its entirety without making any findings.
The bankruptcy appellate panel vacated the order and remanded. Because an entry of
default was not entered against American Capital, the bankruptcy court could not proceed
to enter default judgment by granting the avoidance motion. Further, §522(f)(2) would
provide nonexempt equity of $91,497.50 to which judgment liens could remain attached.
Judicial liens that are being avoided under §522(f) as impairing exemptions are
deducted in reverse order of priority. Bank of America v Hanger (In re Hanger) (9th Cir
1999) 196 F3d 1292. Liens already avoided are excluded from the exemption-impairment
calculation with respect to other liens. 11 USC §522(f)(2)(B).
The bankruptcy court did not enter default against American Capital, and therefore
could not enter default judgment. Default judgment is a matter of discretion in which the
court may consider, among other things, the merits of the substantive claim. If the
plaintiff is not entitled to the relief requested, then the court should not enter default and
may even enter judgment in favor of the defaulted defendant. Cashco Fin. Servs., Inc. v
McGee (In re McGee) (BAP 9th Cir 2006) 359 BR 764. Meyer was not entitled to
judgment on the merits.
An avoidance motion prevents the fixing of a judgment lien on an interest of the debtor
in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor is
entitled. 11 USC §522(f)(1)(A). The exemption is impaired if, subtracting all of the
unavoidable liens and the exemption from the value of the debtor’s half interest, the yield
is zero or less. 11 USC §522(f)(2).
In the case of fractionally owned property, if all the consensual liens are subtracted
from the fractional interest, as literally required by §522(f)(2), the result could be that
judicial liens are avoided that do not impair an exemption. Congress intended to overrule
judicial decisions that had the consequence of frustrating a debtor’s ability to receive the
full exemption authorized by law. A common-sense application, which conforms with
congressional intent, nets out consensual liens against the entire fee in co-owned property

before determining the value of a debtor’s fractional interest and excludes those liens
from the calculation of “all other liens on the property” under §522(f)(2)(A)(ii).
By applying a mechanical approach, the bankruptcy court had effectively provided an
exemption to Meyer of $141,497.50 when only $50,000 was merited. The goal is to
achieve a balance between the creditor and debtor by assuring that the debtor receives the
full exemption permitted by law and that the creditors secured by judicial liens do not
lose their secured positions in value that is not exempt.
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: All Points Capital Inc. v Meyer attempts to resolve the issue of how
to apply 11 USC §522(f)’s formula for avoiding judgment liens on property in which the
debtor holds only a partial interest. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that in determining
the extent of avoidance, liens encumbering the entire property must be deducted from the
whole property’s value, not just from the value of the debtor’s partial interest in the property.
Meyer makes it much easier for judgment liens on a debtor’s partial interest in property to
survive the debtor’s bankruptcy. Attorneys practicing in the Ninth Circuit, however, should
caution clients who hold judgment liens that they should not rely too heavily on Meyer. The
case is likely to be reversed on its pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit because the BAP
ignored §522(f)’s plain meaning.
A statute’s plain meaning must not be ignored except in the rare instance when its plain
meaning causes an absurd result demonstrably at odds with congressional intent. The
Meyer panel engaged in pure judicial activism by admittedly ignoring §522(f)’s plain
meaning and “generously” interpreting §522(f) to reach a result the court believed made
“common sense” without any evidence that §522(f)’s plain meaning was contrary to
congressional intent or caused an absurd result.
Determining the extent to which a judgment lien will be avoided under §522(f) by using a
formula that deducts liens encumbering an entire property from the value of the debtor’s
partial interest in that property is not inherently absurd. That very formula is used in similar
contexts, such as when determining whether a judgment lien holder may foreclose on a
California debtor’s partial interest in a homestead; it is the basis for an exemption under 11
USC §522(b)(3)(B). Further, §522(f)’s legislative history does not discuss in any way how
the section impacts a debtor’s partial interest in property. Thus, it is difficult to understand
how the Meyer panel could have found that applying §522(f)’s plain meaning to a debtor’s
partial interest in property was demonstrably contrary to congressional intent.
In short, although at first blush Meyer seems to be a victory for judgment lien holders, the
ultimate win likely will go to the debtors.—Roger Bernhardt

